Walker v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government
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[Note: Edited from the ]
Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-161-DJH-LLK
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, February 1, 2022
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Kenneth Walker, III. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government
[...]
David J. Hale, Judge
The facts alleged in Plaintiff Kenneth Walker, III’s complaint arise from Louisville Metro Police Department’s search of Breonna Taylor’s apartment.
Believing that intruders were attempting to break into Taylor’s apartment, Walker, Taylor’s boyfriend and a licensed gun owner, asserts that he fired a single shot at the LMPD officers upon their entry. The officers returned fire, killing Taylor. Walker sued Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government and several LMPD officers, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move the Court to abstain or, alternatively, to dismiss Walker’s complaint. After careful consideration, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion of Metro and Defendants Hoover, James, Nobles, Campbell, Huckelberry, Phan, Goodlett, and Burbrink (the “Metro defendants”). The Court will deny the motions to dismiss of Defendants Mattingly, Cosgrove, Jaynes, and Hankison.
[...] On March 12, 2020, LMPD Detective Joshua Jaynes applied for a warrant to search Breonna Taylor’s apartment, located on Springfield Drive. Jaynes also applied for a warrant to search a residence on Elliott Avenue, at which Jamarcus Glover and Adrian Walker[1] were suspected of drug trafficking. Jaynes stated in his warrant affidavit that he had witnessed Glover and Adrian Walker dropping “suspected narcotics” in a rock pile on Elliot Avenue to resupply the Elliot Avenue residence.
In support of the warrant to search Taylor’s apartment, LMPD Sergeant Jonathan Mattingly and LMPD Detectives Shawn Nobles and Kelly Goodlett asked the Shively Police Department for assistance and to verify with the local office of the United States Postal Inspection Service that Glover had been receiving packages at Taylor’s residence. A Postal Inspector denied that any packages for Glover were delivered to Taylor’s apartment, and the Shively Police Department relayed this information to Mattingly, Nobles, and Goodlett. Mattingly then “conveyed to ... Jaynes that the US Postal Inspector had verified that [Glover] was receiving packages” at Taylor’s residence. Jaynes “endorsed” Mattingly’s “falsehoods” and “further extended them” in his warrant affidavit by testifying that he had “personally verified” with a Postal Inspector that Glover had been receiving packages at Taylor’s apartment “to avoid detection from law enforcement” and “for safe keeping.”
Jaynes also stated in his affidavit that on January 16, 2020, he witnessed Glover retrieve a single package from Taylor’s apartment and then drive “to a known drug house.” Jaynes further asserted that he observed Taylor’s car parked at the Elliot Avenue residence and a car used by both Glover and Adrian Walker parked at Taylor’s residence on several occasions. Jaynes added that he had verified “through multiple computer databases” that Taylor lived at the Springfield Drive residence and that as of February 20, 2020, Glover “use[d]” the Springfield Drive residence “as his current home address.” Jaynes requested a no-knock warrant due to “these drug trafficker[s’] ... history of attempting to destroy evidence” and “fleeing from law enforcement,” although Taylor had no criminal history. Based on Jaynes’s affidavit, a Jefferson Circuit Court judge issued a no-knock warrant to search Taylor’s apartment, among other locations, including the Elliot Avenue residence.
At an operational meeting before the searches, LMPD officers reclassified the search of Taylor’s residence as a “knock-and-announce” search, expecting that Taylor would be home alone. Officers believed that Taylor’s residence was a “soft target” that “posed no threat” and expected the search would be “low key.” On March 13, Mattingly and Nobles, as well as LMPD Lieutenant Shawn Hoover, Officer Michael Campbell, and Detectives Myles Cosgrove, Tony James, and Brett Hankison executed a midnight search of Taylor’s apartment. Taylor and Kenneth Walker III, her boyfriend, were sleeping inside the apartment. Mattingly “banged” on the front door, and Taylor at least twice yelled, “Who is it?” The officers failed to announce their identity or that they were executing a search warrant.
Walker, a licensed firearm owner, retrieved his gun, believing unlawful intruders were breaking into Taylor’s apartment. Within one minute after knocking, the officers, who were in plain clothes, used a battering ram to force open the front door. Walker fired a single shot at the officers upon their unannounced entry, still believing they were intruders. Mattingly and Cosgrove responded by firing twenty-two shots into the apartment in less than one minute, although Cosgrove could not clearly see Taylor and Walker. Hankison fired shots into the apartment through the patio door and windows. Six shots from the officers struck Taylor, killing her. Mattingly was shot once in the leg and survived. Officers found no contraband or evidence of drug trafficking in Taylor’s apartment. Walker was initially charged with murder and later attempted murder and first-degree assault for allegedly shooting Mattingly, but the criminal charges were ultimately dismissed with prejudice.
In April 2020, one month after the search of Taylor’s apartment, Jaynes asked Shively Police Department Sergeant Timothy Saylor if Glover’s packages had been delivered to Taylor’s address. Saylor stated that no packages for Glover were delivered there. Chief Yvette Gentry later terminated Jaynes for “a sustained untruthfulness violation based on information included in [his] affidavit.”
In September 2020, Walker filed an action in Jefferson Circuit Court against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, Mayor Greg Fischer, and LMPD officers[2] in their official and individual capacities, seeking [the court's declaration] under Kentucky state law that (1) he is immune from further arrest, detention, charges, and prosecution under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.085 (which provides that “a law enforcement agency” may not arrest an individual who uses force as permitted under Kentucky law unless there is probable cause that the force used was unlawful); (2) Metro’s “county sovereign immunity” violates the Kentucky Constitution; and (3) Metro’s immunity is waived up to the limits of insurance. Walker also sought damages, claiming (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false arrest and imprisonment; (4) malicious prosecution; (5) abuse of process; (6) negligence per se; (7) general negligence; and (8) supervisory negligence.
Walker filed the present action on March 12, 2021, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that Jaynes, Mattingly, Nobles, Goodlett, LMPD Lieutenant Jerry Huckelberry, Sergeant Luke Phan, and Major Kimberly Burbrink violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining and approving a search warrant based on “materially false” information. Count II asserts that Mattingly, Nobles, Cosgrove, Hankison, Hoover, James, and Campbell violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to announce before they entered Taylor’s apartment. Count III alleges that Mattingly, Nobles, Cosgrove, Hankison, Hoover, James, and Campbell violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive and unreasonable force when they executed the warrant. Count IV asserts that Metro’s policies and practices proximately caused violations of Walker’s Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants move the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this action or to dismiss Walker’s complaint on the basis of qualified immunity.
[...]
Jaynes, Mattingly, Cosgrove, and the individual Metro defendants move the Court to dismiss Counts I, II, and III of Walker’s complaint based on qualified immunity. Count I asserts that Jaynes, Mattingly, Nobles, Huckelberry, Phan, Goodlett, and Burbrink violated Walker’s Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining and approving a search warrant based on “materially false” information. Count II alleges that Mattingly, Nobles, Cosgrove, Hoover, Hankison, James, and Campbell, the individuals who executed the warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to announce before they entered Taylor’s apartment. Count III asserts that Mattingly, Nobles, Cosgrove, Hoover, Hankison, James, and Campbell violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive and unreasonable force in executing the warrant.
Qualified immunity protects government officials who “perform[ ] discretionary functions” from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” [...] In evaluating a § 1983 claim, courts must assess whether (1) “the allegations give rise to a constitutional violation” and (2) “whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident.” [...]
“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” [...] Still, the Sixth Circuit has cautioned against “ ‘resolv[ing] a [motion to dismiss] on qualified immunity grounds’ because development of the factual record is frequently necessary to decide whether the official’s actions violated clearly established law.” [...]
“[R]eading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” the Court must ask whether “it is plausible that an official’s acts violated the plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right.” [. . .] As in any motion to dismiss, the plausibility standard requires the plaintiff to plead “factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” [...] Threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements,” do not suffice, and the Court need not accept such statements as true. [...] “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” [...] As explained below, Walker sufficiently alleges that LMPD officers obtained a warrant that was invalid, failed to announce before entering, and used unreasonable and excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant based on probable cause “from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). Probable cause demands “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” [...] Officers violate the warrant requirement if they make “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” in a warrant affidavit and the “false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Id. at 385 [...].
a. Joshua Jaynes
Walker alleges that Jaynes deliberately lied in his warrant affidavit when Jaynes stated in Paragraph 9 that he verified with a Postal Inspector that Glover had been receiving packages at Taylor’s apartment. Walker asserts that without this misstatement, the search of Taylor’s apartment was not supported by probable cause. Walker further contends that the entirety of Jaynes’s affidavit should be treated as materially false because Chief Gentry terminated Jaynes for what she described as “a sustained untruthfulness violation based on information [Jaynes] included in [the] affidavit.” Jaynes maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity under the standard articulated in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986), because a “reasonable” officer in his position “could have believed that probable cause existed to search” Taylor’s apartment. He asserts that he did not knowingly lie in his affidavit, stating that Mattingly told him that a Postal Inspector verified that Glover’s packages were delivered to Taylor’s apartment. Jaynes also argues that even if he did knowingly lie in Paragraph 9, the remainder of the affidavit established probable cause to search Taylor’s apartment.
Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Walker, [...] the Court finds that Walker has plausibly alleged that Jaynes submitted his affidavit to the judge with knowledge that Paragraph 9 was false. Walker claims that Jaynes stated that he personally verified through Shively PD that the United States Postal Inspection Service confirmed that Glover had been receiving packages at Taylor’s apartment, though Jaynes never spoke to Shively PD. Moreover, Walker alleges that Jaynes contacted Shively PD a month after the search of Taylor’s apartment and asked if Glover had received packages at Taylor’s address. [...] Walker’s allegation is further supported by Chief Gentry’s statements, set out in the complaint, regarding Jaynes’s termination for “a sustained untruthfulness violation.” Jaynes’s discussion of Malley is inapt. The officer in Malley believed that the facts in his warrant affidavit were true and was mistaken that they were sufficient to establish probable cause,[...] whereas Walker alleges that Jaynes deliberately lied in his warrant affidavit.
As Walker accurately notes [...,] it is clearly established that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he knowingly submits materially false information in a warrant affidavit. [...] Walker alleges that Jaynes deliberately lied in Paragraph 9, which was a material statement linking Glover to Taylor’s apartment and thus Taylor’s apartment to illegal activity. [...] The Court thus cannot conclude at this early stage that Jaynes is entitled to qualified immunity. [...]
b. Jonathan Mattingly and Michael Nobles
Walker alleges that Mattingly and Nobles separately asked the Shively PD to contact the local office of the United States Postal Inspection Service about Glover’s packages. Walker further claims that the Shively PD then told Mattingly and Nobles that a Postal Inspector denied that any packages for Glover were delivered to Taylor’s residence. [...] Walker’s complaint alleges that Mattingly nevertheless “conveyed to Defendant Jaynes that the US Postal Inspector had verified that [Glover] was receiving packages at Ms. Taylor’s home.” Mattingly maintains that he told Jaynes there were no packages for Glover sent to Taylor’s apartment, while Jaynes claims that Mattingly told him packages for Glover were sent to Taylor’s apartment.
Mattingly, like Jaynes, argues that the warrant was supported by probable cause even without Paragraph 9. But as explained above, Paragraph 9 was material to the probable cause finding. [...] Mattingly further asserts that existing precedent did not clearly establish that his “minimal role” as a non-affiant in securing the warrant was a constitutional violation. [...] Similarly, Nobles contends that he was not involved in securing the search warrant and thus cannot be held liable for any unreasonable search.
A non-affiant may be liable for an affiant’s falsehoods if the non-affiant “played a major role in preparing the affidavit” and “it would be apparent to a reasonable officer” that the warrant was constitutionally deficient. Wheeler, 660 F.3d at 942. In Wheeler, the Sixth Circuit denied a non-affiant officer qualified immunity when he was involved in the investigation to procure the warrant even though he did not execute the warrant. Id. at 942–43. Similarly, Walker has plausibly alleged that Mattingly and Nobles played a major role in the investigation by speaking to Shively PD about Glover’s packages and then executing the search warrant. Under Wheeler, Walker’s allegation that Mattingly and Nobles spoke to Shively PD is sufficient to deny them qualified immunity at this stage as to Count I. [...]
c. Kelly Goodlett, Jerry Huckelberry, Luke Phan, and Kimberly Burbrink
Like Mattingly and Nobles, Goodlett asked Shively PD to inquire with the United States Postal Inspection Service about Glover’s packages, and Shively PD told Goodlett that no packages for Glover were sent to Taylor’s address. Nevertheless, Goodlett, as a supervisory officer, either approved Jaynes’s affidavit or, contrary to LMPD policy, failed to review the affidavit before Jaynes submitted it to a judge. Walker does not allege that Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink gathered information in support of the affidavit but does claim that they were supervisory officers who failed to review Jaynes’s affidavit before he submitted it to the judge. Goodlett, Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink argue that qualified immunity protects them from liability for Jaynes’s improper actions.
A plaintiff plausibly alleges supervisory liability for another’s offense if the plaintiff asserts that the supervisor “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officer[ ].” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) [...]. This liability “requires more than negligence or recklessness.” [...] There must also be a “causal connection” between the supervisor’s “wrongful conduct and the violation alleged.” Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242.
Walker has plausibly alleged that Goodlett at least “knowingly acquiesced” in Jaynes’s unconstitutional conduct. Walker claims that Goodlett knew Glover’s packages were not sent to Taylor’s address, yet either approved Jaynes’s affidavit or failed to review the affidavit, in violation of LMPD policy. Thus, Walker has put forth sufficient factual allegations that Goodlett knew Jaynes’s affidavit was false and, at a minimum, knowingly acquiesced in its submission, which caused an invalid warrant to issue. [...]
Walker fails to plausibly allege supervisory liability for Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink, however. Walker asserts only that these defendants “violated their duty to conduct a good faith review of Defendant Jaynes’ affidavit” and “knew or [were] reckless in failing to know” that Jaynes’s affidavit was false. This conclusory allegation is inadequate and contrasts with Walker’s claims against Goodlett, which describe with specificity that Goodlett’s knowledge stemmed from her conversation with Shively PD. [...] Therefore, Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink are entitled to qualified immunity, and their motions to dismiss will be granted, while Goodlett’s will be denied. [...]
The Fourth Amendment generally requires officers executing a search warrant to “knock and announce that they are seeking entry into a home and then wait a reasonable amount of time before entering.” Greer v. City of Highland Park, 884 F.3d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 2018) [...]. While “the potential presence of drugs ‘lessens the length of time law enforcement must ordinarily wait outside before entering a residence,’ it does not justify abandonment of the knock-and-announce rule.” Id. [...]. And nighttime searches are “more intrusive than searches conducted during the day,” requiring a longer waiting time before officers may enter. Id. at 317[...].
“[I]t is clearly established law that the [F]ourth [A]mendment forbids the unannounced, forcible entry of a dwelling absent exigent circumstances.” Id. at 316–17 [...]. “Exigent circumstances may include the following situations: ‘(1) there would be a danger to the officer; (2) there would be danger of flight or destruction of evidence; (3) a victim or some other person is in peril; or (4) it would be a useless gesture such as when the person within already knew the officer’s authority and purpose.’” Id. at 317 [...].
Walker claims that Hankison, Mattingly, Cosgrove, Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell violated the knock-and-announce requirement by failing to announce before entering Taylor’s apartment, although he concedes that the officers knocked. Mattingly and Cosgrove argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they announced and had a valid no-knock warrant, which permitted their entry without knocking and announcing. Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell contend that they “were not present at the scene when the events took place.”
Walker has plausibly alleged that the officers failed to announce when executing the warrant. Despite Taylor asking the individuals knocking to identify themselves, the officers failed to respond or otherwise announce their presence. Walker has also plausibly alleged that the officers listed in his complaint, including Mattingly, Cosgrove, Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell, were part of the entry team executing the warrant, and members of an entry team can be liable for a failure to knock and announce. [...]
Whether the officers acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances in anticipating exigent circumstances is a question of fact. See Greer, 884 F.3d at 317–18. Neither “the presence of drugs alone” nor the mere possibility of evidence destruction vitiates the knock-and-announce requirement [...] Moreover, the issuance of a no-knock warrant does not end the reasonableness inquiry. United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001); see United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[O]fficers must have more than a mere hunch or suspicion before an exigency can excuse the necessity for knocking and announcing their presence.”).
As set forth in Walker’s complaint, the officers did not anticipate exigent circumstances when they executed the warrant because they planned to knock and announce, believing that Taylor, who had no criminal history, would be home alone and that her residence was “a soft target.” Because Walker plausibly alleges that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the officers’ failure to announce, the defendants’ motions to dismiss must be denied as to Count II. See Greer, 884 F.3d at 317–18 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss when plaintiffs plausibly alleged that “exigent circumstances did not excuse the officers’ disregard of the knock-and-announce rule”).
“[T]he right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.” [...] “An officer’s use of force is excessive if, under the totality of the circumstances, the force was objectively unreasonable.” Moore v. City of Memphis, 853 F.3d 866, 870 (6th Cir. 2017) [...] Because this standard “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), it is a “fact intensive-inquiry” and thus one in which it is “generally inappropriate” for a court to grant qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. [...]
a. Jonathan Mattingly and Myles Cosgrove
Walker claims that the officers, who were in plain clothes, failed to announce when they entered Taylor’s apartment and thus created a dangerous situation that led to his single shot at the officers. Walker further alleges that Mattingly and Cosgrove returned fire at Taylor and Walker, despite Cosgrove’s inability to clearly see them. Walker distinguishes the officers’ failure to announce upon entry from their failure to announce when they knocked.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that “where ‘the events preceding the shooting occurred in close temporal proximity to the shooting, those events have been considered in analyzing whether excessive force was used.’” [...]
The Court acknowledges that “[a] different Fourth Amendment violation cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure.” Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1544 (2017). But Walker alleges a failure-to-knock-and-announce claim separate from the excessive-force claim, which stems from the officers’ failure to announce upon entry. Here, the officers’ failure to announce upon entry occurred either simultaneously with or mere seconds before the shooting. Under the facts alleged, whether Mattingly and Cosgrove acted reasonably and thus are entitled to qualified immunity cannot be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage. [...]
[...]
b. Shawn Hoover, Michael Campbell, Tony James, and Michael Nobles
Walker asserts that Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell should be held liable for failing to identify themselves upon entry and for failing to intervene when Mattingly, Hankison, and Cosgrove shot at him. [...] Walker does not claim that Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell discharged their firearms. Therefore, Walker’s excessive-force claim against these defendants depends on their failure to intervene when other officers shot at him. [...]
Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell argue that they “did not discharge[ ] their weapons” and thus cannot be found liable for the other officers’ alleged use of excessive force. These defendants, however, fail to address their alleged failure to intervene. And contrary to their assertion, they can be held liable for other officers’ use of excessive force if they “(1) ‘observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) [...] had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.’” Sheffey v. City of Covington, 564 F. Appx 783, 793 (6th Cir. 2014) [...] The Court will therefore deny their motion to dismiss as to Count III. [...]
[T]he Court finds that Walker has plausibly alleged that Jaynes, Mattingly, Goodlett, and Nobles obtained a warrant to search Taylor’s apartment that was invalid. Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink, however, are entitled to qualified immunity for the constitutionally defective warrant. Walker has also plausibly alleged that Mattingly, Cosgrove, Hoover, James, Nobles, Campbell, and Hankiso failed to announce before entering Taylor’s apartment and that Mattingly and Cosgrove used unreasonable and excessive force against him. Because Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell do not address Walker’s allegation that they failed to intervene when the other officers allegedly used excessive force, this claim against them also survives. Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1) Defendant Hankison’s motion to dismiss . . . is DENIED.
(2) Defendant Jaynes’s motion to dismiss . . . is DENIED.
(3) The motion to dismiss of Defendants Mattingly and Cosgrove . . . is DENIED.
(4) The Metro defendants’ motion to dismiss . . . is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to Defendants Huckelberry, Phan, and Burbrink on Count I. It is DENIED as to Goodlett on Count I; Hoover, James, Nobles, and Campbell on Counts II and III; and Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government on Count IV. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Lieutenant Jerry Huckelberry, Sergeant Luke Phan, and Major Kimberly Burbrink as defendants in the record of this matter.
Endnotes
1
No relation to Plaintiff Kenneth Walker, III.
2
These individuals include Detective Joshua Jaynes, Detective Brett Hankison, Detective Myles Cosgrove, Sergeant Jonathan Mattingly, Lieutenant Shawn Hoover, Detective Tony James, Detective Michael Nobles, Officer Michael Campbell, Officer Andrea Shaw, Sergeant Chad Tinnell, Sergeant Amanda Seelye, and Former Chief Steve Conrad.