Footnotes: Consensual Encounters
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 13.
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 13.
United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 200. ALSO SEE People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309.
U.S. v. Ayon-Meza (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 1130, 1133.
See U.S. v. Tavolacci (D.C. Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1423, 1425.
See I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 215.
People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 877.
See People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 866.
See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 438. ALSO SEE Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 256-57.
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434.
See United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 202 [“The reasonable person test is objective and presupposes an innocent person.”].
U.S. v. Kim (3d Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 947, 953.
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1507, 1512.
See, for example, Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 438.
See Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 260-61; In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.
People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 345.
See People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371; U.S. v. Thompson (7th Cir. 1997) 106 F.3d 794, 798.
See U.S. v. Analla (4th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 119, 124.
See U.S. v. McCoy (4th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 405, 411 [“uncomfortable does not equal unconstitutional”].
In re Kemonte H. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1507, 1512.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 125; People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935.
People v. Spicer (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213, 220.
Morgan v. Woessner (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1244, 1253.
See Howes v. Fields (2012) U.S. [132 S.Ct. 1181, 1184; People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 607; People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, fn.1.
See California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 627-28; Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39.
U.S. v. Black (4th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 531, 538.
In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.
See, for example, People v. Spicer (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213, 218 [the notion that a contacted suspect would ever feel perfectly free to disregard an officer’s requests may be “the greatest legal fiction of the late 20th century”].
See U.S. v. Weaver (4th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 302, 311.
U.S. v. Ayon-Meza (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 1130, 1133. Also see U.S. v. Ringold (10th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1168, 1174.
United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554.
See People v. Brown (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1442, 1448; People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 555; People v. Roth (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 211; People v. Rodriguez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 238; People v. Foranyic (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 186, 188.
People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 556. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Winsor (9th Cir. en banc 1988) 846 F.2d 1569, 1573, fn.3.
People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 402.
People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1282.
U.S. v. McFarley (4th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 1188, 1191. ALSO SEE Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 128.
(1987) 192 CA3 935, 941. ALSO SEE In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal4th 805, 821 [we consider “the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled”]; U.S. v. Jones (4th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 293, 303 [“A request certainly is not an order [but it may convey] the requisite show of authority”].
(6th Cir. 1995) 72 F.3d 1217, 1220, fn.2.
See People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 268 [“The manner in which the police arrived at defendant’s home, accosted him, and secured his ‘consent’ to accompany them suggested they did not intend to take ‘no’ for an answer.”].
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519, 523.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497; U.S. v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 414, 427.
See Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 436 [“Certainly few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so.”]; Brower v. County of Inyo (1989) 489 U.S. 593, 597 [“flashing lights” constituted a “show of authority”]; People v. Ellis (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1202, fn.3 [a detention results when “an officer activated the overhead red light of his police car”].
People v. Bailey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 402, 405-6.
See Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254; Brower v. County of Inyo (1989) 489 U.S. 593, 596-97; U.S. v. Al Nasser (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 722, 731.
(2007) 551 U.S. 249, 257. Edited. ALSO SEE Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 332; U.S. v. Jones (6th Cir. 2009) 562 F.3d 768, 774.
See U.S. v. Dockter (8th Cir. 1995) 58 F.3d 1284, 1287.
See U.S. v. Kerr (9th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 1384, 1387; U.S. v. Jones (6th Cir. 2009) 562 F.3d 768, 772 [“Here, by blocking in the Nissan, the officers had communicated to a reasonable person occupying the Nissan that he or she was not free to drive away.”]; U.S. v. Packer (7th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 654, 657 [“the officers’ vehicles were parked both in front and behind the Defendant’s car”]. COMPARE Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 575 [the officers did not drive their car “in an aggressive manner to block respondent’s course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement”].
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804.
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 940. ALSO SEE People v. Banks (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1362 [officer stopped “behind defendant’s car”]; People v. Brueckner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1505 [officer parked “next to” suspect’s car]; People v. Juarez (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 631 [officer pulled patrol car alongside suspect]; U.S. v. Pajari (8th Cir. 1983) 715 F.2d 1378, 1380 [the officers “simply parked behind his car”].
See People v. Banks (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1362; People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1946; U.S. v. Summers (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 683, 687.
(9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3d 1161, 1167.
(9th Cir. 1988) 853 F.2d 1501, 1503, 1504.
See Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 504 [“[B]y informing him that he was free to go if he so desired, the officers may have obviated any claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish.”]; People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 856 [“You’re not under arrest, I’m not detaining you, you’re free to leave and not speak to me if you don’t want to.”]; Morgan v. Woessner (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1244, 1254 [“Although an officer’s failure to advise a citizen of his freedom to walk away is not dispositive of the question of whether the citizen knew he was free to go, it is another significant indicator of what the citizen reasonably believed.”].
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 555; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39-40; People v. Daugherty (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 275, 283-84; U.S. v. Jones (10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 1300, 1314 [“the officers were not required to inform Mr. Jones that he was free to leave”].
People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 877.
See U.S. v. Finke (7th Cir. 1996) 85 F.3d 1275, 1281; U.S. v. Beck (8th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1129, 1136-37.
U.S. v. Sandoval (10th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 537. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Ramos (8th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1160, 1162-64 [although the driver’s license was returned to him, he was asked to remain in the patrol car while the officer spoke with the passenger].
U.S. v. Ramos, (8th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1160, 1162-64.
U.S. v. Elliott (10th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 810, 814.
U.S. v. McSwain (10th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 558, 563.
See I.N.S. v. Delgado (1994) 466 U.S. 210, 217, fn.5 [“other people were in the area”]; U.S. v. Yusuff (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 982, 986 [“the encounter was in a busy, public area of the airport”]; U.S. v. Sanchez (10th Cir. 1996) 89 F.3d 715, 718 [the encounter occurred “in an open and well illuminated parking lot”]; U.S. v. Ringold (10th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1168, 1172 [the encounter occurred “in the public space outside the service station, in full view of other patrons”]; U.S. v. Spence (10th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 1280, 1283 [“This court does consider interaction in a nonpublic place and the absence of other members of the public as factors pointing toward a nonconsensual encounter.”].
United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204.
People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 45.
U.S. v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 1223, 1227.
U.S. v. Kim (3rd Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 947, 952.
People v. Ross (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 879, 885 [the officer “‘asked’ but did not demand that appellant remove her hands from her pockets”]; People v. Epperson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 115, 118, 120 [officer asked the suspect to identify an object in his pocket].
(9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3d 1161, 1167.
People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Jones (4th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 293, 305 [officers “quickly approached Jones . . . and nearly immediately asked first that he lift his shirt and then that he consent to a pat down”]. NOTE: While one California court ruled that such a command did not automatically result in a detention (In re Frank V.(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239), to our knowledge no other court has adopted this reasoning
(1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 124, 130-31. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Stewart (8th Cir. 2011) 631 F.3d 453, 456.
See People v. Rico (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 124, 130 [“momentarily” spotlighting of a vehicle “was ambiguous”]; People v. Brueckner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1505 [“The fact he shined his spotlight on the vehicle as he parked in the unlit area would not, by itself, lead a reasonable person to conclude he or she was not free to leave.”]; U.S. v. Mabery (8th Cir. 2012) 686 F.3d 591, 597 [“the act of shining a spotlight on Mabery’s vehicle from the street was certainly no more intrusive (and arguably less so) than knocking on the vehicle’s window”]. NOTE: In People v. Gary (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1111 the court melodramatically described the spotlighting of the defendant as “bath[ing] him in light.” Still, the dip did not appear to be a significant circumstance.
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496.
(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935.
See U.S. v. Stewart (8th Cir. 2011) 631 F.3d 453, 456 [pat search is both a search and seizure]; People v. Rodriguez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 238 [suspect was patted down and told to sit on the curb]; U.S. v. Black (4th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 531, 538. BUT ALSO SEE People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 46-67 [routine pat searching of unarrested suspect before he voluntarily got into a police car for a ride to the station did not convert the encounter into an arrest].
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240, fn.3.
See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342 [“no one was handcuffed or patted down”]; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240, fn.3; People v. Gallant (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 200, 207; Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 128 [“[he] was never handcuffed” and he “was left in the unlocked backseat of the police car”].
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [“the display of a weapon by an officer” is a circumstance “that might indicate a seizure”]; People v. McKelvy (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1034 [one of the officers carried a shotgun]; People v. Gallant (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 200, 204 [“One of the police officers answered defendant’s knock at the door by drawing his gun, opening the door, and confronting defendant.”].
See U.S. v. Chan-Jimenez (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 1324, 1326.
See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 346; U.S. v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 1223, 1227.
United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 205.
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [“the threatening presence of several officers” is relevant]; In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; U.S. v. Black (4th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 531, 538 [“Four uniformed officers approached the men, a number that quickly increased to six uniformed officers, and then seven.”]; U.S. v. Quintero (8th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 660, 670.
(9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 1060, 1068.
(6th Cir. 1995) 72 F.3d 1217, 1224.
U.S. v. Kim (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1426, 1431, fn.3. ALSO SEE People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 877 [“Here initially there were three defendants and only two officers. Only later did the third officer even the numbers. This does not constitute a show of force”]; U.S. v. Crapser (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3d 1141, 1146 [“Although there were four officers present, most of the time only two talked to Defendant, while two talked to Twilligear”]; U.S. v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 1223, 1227 [“while four officers were on the premises, only one . . . approached Mr. Thompson”]; U.S. v. Yusuff(7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 982, 986 [“the officers stood several feet away from Yusuff”].
U.S. v. Kim (3rd Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 947, 954.
U.S. v. $25,000 (9th Cir. 1988) 853 F.2d 1501, 1504-1505.
U.S. v. White (8th Cir. 1996) 81 F.3d 774, 779; U.S. v. Jones (10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 1300, 1314 [“while there were three officers on the scene . . . the officers’ presence was nonthreatening”].
(1969) 268 CA2 653, 665.
People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941. ALSO SEE People v. Ross (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 879, 884-85 [“It is the mode or manner in which the request for identification is put to the citizen, and not the nature of the request that determines whether compliance was voluntary.”]; People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 293, fn.2 [“both form and content are important.”]; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1239 [“Both the nature and the manner must be examined.”]; U.S. v. Ledesma (10th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3d 1307, 1314 [relevant circumstance is the “use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request is compulsory” as opposed to “an officer’s pleasant manner and tone of voice that is not insisting”].
(4th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 293, 303.
(9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 488, 495.
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 128.
People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 402. ALSO SEE United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204 [the officer spoke “in a polite, quiet voice”]; U.S. v. Kim (3rd Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 947, 953 [the officer’s tone was “polite and conversational.”]; U.S. v. Flowers(4th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 707, 711 [“they spoke to him in a casual tone of voice”]; U.S. v. Cruz-Mendez (10th Cir. 2006) 467 F.3d 1260, 1254 [the officers “acted courteously”]; U.S. v. Cormier (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 1103, 1110 [the officer “never spoke to Cormier in an authoritative tone”]; U.S. v. Ringold (10th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1168, 1172 [the officer “was polite and the conversation was friendly in tone”]; U.S. v. Yusuff (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 982, 986, 986 [“a normal, polite tone of voice”]; U.S. v. Tavolacci (D.C. Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1423, 1425 [“conversational tones”]; U.S. v. Orman (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 1170, 1175 [he “politely asked him if he could have a word with him”].
People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 48.
U.S. v. Jones (10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 1300, 1314.
People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.
U.S. v. $25,000 (9th Cir. 1988) 853 F.2d 1501, 1505.
U.S. v. Dockter (8th Cir. 1995) 58 F.3d 1284, 1287. ALSO SEE People v. Epperson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 115, 120 [“There was nothing in the officer’s attitude or the nature of the inquiry which would indicate to a reasonable person that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled or that defendant was not free to leave.”]; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 47 [“The record lacks any indication their dialogue was coercive [there was] nothing apparent in [the officer’s] attitude or the nature of his inquiry to reflect compulsory compliance”].
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 293.
(4th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 320, 323.
(9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3d 1141, 1144. ALSO SEE United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 198.
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213. ALSO SEE People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1111-12 [“rather than engage in a conversation, [the officer] immediately and pointedly inquired about defendant’s legal status as he quickly approached”].
See I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 501; United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 555; United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 201; People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437.
People v. Ross (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 879, 884-85.
See Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 503 [“Here, Royer’s ticket and identification remained in the possession of the officers throughout the encounter . . . As a practical matter, Royer could not leave the airport without them.”]; U.S. v. Black (4th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 531, 538 [“We have noted that though not dispositive, the retention of a citizen’s identification or other personal property or effects is highly material under the totality of the circumstances analysis.”]. COMPARE People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 879 [there was “no retention of Profit’s briefcase”].
U.S. v. Chan-Jimenez (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 1324, 1326.
U.S. v. Jones (10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 1300, 1315. BUT ALSO SEE U.S. v. Analla (4th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 119, 124 [“[The officer] necessarily had to keep Analla’s license and registration for a short time in order to check it with the dispatcher.”]; U.S. v. Weaver (4th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 303, 309 [“Weaver was in no way impeded physically by holding his identification from him”].
U.S. v. Chan-Jimenez (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 1324, 1326.
U.S. v. Black (4th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 531, 538.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434; I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497.
See U.S. v. Beck (1998) 140 F.3d 1129, 1135 [questioning can result in a seizure if “the questioning is so intimidating, threatening or coercive that a reasonable person would not have believed himself free to leave”]. COMPARE United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 203 [“The officer gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers’ questions.”].
U.S. v. Ringold (10th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1168, 1174.
People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 293. ALSO SEE Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 502 [“[The officers] informed him they were narcotics agents and had reason to believe that he was carrying illegal drugs.”]; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 268 [defendant “was subjected to more than an hour of directly accusatory questioning [at the police station], in which [an officer] repeatedly told him— falsely—that the police knew he was the killer.”]; U.S. v. Washington (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 1060, 1069 [suspect detained when officers told him he was “arrestable”]; U.S. v. Gonzales (5th Cir. 1996) 79 F3 413, 420 [“There is one troubling element: the officers informed Gonzales that the car he was driving was suspected of being used to transport drugs. This may have pushed the encounter, which was initially consensual, to being a [detention].”].
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 777.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439.
(3rd Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 947, 953. ALSO SEE People v. Daugherty (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 275, 285 [“[The officer] did not directly accuse Daugherty of transporting narcotics, which may have been sufficient to convert the encounter into a detention.”]; People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 865 [“[The officer] made no statement that he had information that the defendants were carrying drugs.”]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328 [“The conversation was nonaccusatory”]; U.S. v. Ringold (10th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 1168, 1174 [although the questions were “of an incriminating nature,” they were “not worded or delivered in such a manner as to indicate that compliance with any officer directives (or even inquiries) was required”]; U.S. v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 1223, 1228 [“Most importantly, under the precedents, [the officer] did not use an antagonistic tone in asking questions.”].
(4th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3d 126, 133-34.
(9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1244, 1253. ALSO SEE I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216-17 [a seizure results “if the person refuses to answer and the police [persist]”]; U.S. v. Wilson (4th Cir. 1991) 953 F.2d 116, 122 [“but the persistence of [the officers] would clearly convey to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave the questioning by the police”].
See I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 219 [“The questioning by INS agents seems to have been nothing more than a brief encounter.]; People v. Hughes(2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328 [“The conversation was nonaccusatory, routine, and brief”]; People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1283 [“The whole incident took around 10 minutes from the initial contact to Bouser’s arrest.”]; U.S. v. Crapser (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3d 1141, 1146 [“The entire event . . . lasted about five minutes.”]; U.S. v. McFarley (4th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 1188, 1192 [20 minutes was not too long under the circumstances]; U.S. v. Cruz-Mendez (10th Cir. 2006) 467 F.3d 1260, 1267 [30 minutes was not unreasonableunder thecircumstances].
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 128. ALSO SEE People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328-29; Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126.
See People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 268.
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 555.
See Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 436; United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 559. Also see United States v. Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181, 188 [ “Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.”
See People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1286; People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246.
(10th Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 1300, 1306, 1315.
(4th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 119, 124.
See People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 402.
See Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 548; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497.
(4th Cir. 1991) 953 F.2d 116.
See United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 206; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39-40.
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 559; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 249.
See United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 557-58; Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 125; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 344-45; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 329.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1121.
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 247.
U.S. v. Anderson (10th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 1059, 1064.
See U.S. v. Sandoval (10th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 537, 540 [“no reasonable person would feel free to leave without such documentation”]; U.S. v. White (8th Cir. 1996) 81 F.3d 775, 779.
U.S. v. Elliott (10th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 810, 814.
See Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39-40; U.S. v. Sullivan (4th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3d 126, 133; U.S. v. Anderson (10th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 1059, 1064.
See U.S. v. Thompson (7th Cir. 1997) 106 F.3d 794, 798.
(9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1244, 1254.
(8th Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 1129, 1136-37. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Finke (7th Cir. 1996) 85 F.3d 1275, 1281.
(8th Cir. 1994) 42 F.3d 1160, 1162-64.
See U.S. v. Thompson (7th Cir. 1997) 106 F.3d 794, 798 [the officer “justified his desire to ask Thompson more questions by explaining that part of his job was to prevent the transport of illegal guns and drugs”].
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